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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Reid Kress Weisbord’s article insightfully identifies what 
may be the next battleground in the rancorous war over the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: trust term extension.1 Seeking to take advantage of the 
abolition of the Rule in many states, trustees of irrevocable trusts settled 
before such a change in law might petition the court to extend the term of 
the trusts they administer, perhaps indefinitely.2 Professor Weisbord is 
rightly skeptical of this move, and he recommends a simple but elegant 
solution: prohibiting the use of modification doctrines to add beneficiaries 
not identified in the original trust document.3 
This essay makes two related points and suggests an alternative solution 
for trust term extension. First, the legal analysis of trust term extension is 
highly sensitive to the baseline one selects, which, in turn, incorporates 
many policy preferences about dead hand control. Thus, the debate about 
trust term extension risks devolving into a debate about whether or not to 
abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities. Second, one’s view of trust term 
extension need not flow directly from one’s view of dead hand control, as 
the practical problems in divining settlor intent with regard to perpetual 
trusts will be shared by disputants on both sides of that debate. A reform 
addressed to these concerns would permit trust term extension, but require 
proponents of modification to provide clear and convincing evidence of 
settlor intent to create a perpetual trust. 
I.  BASELINES  
The Article presents trust term extension as another incarnation of the 
classic tension between the rights of beneficiaries and the settlor’s wishes.4 
It adds an interesting twist by pointing out another classic tension between 
                                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  
 1. Trust Term Extension, 67 FLA. L. REV. 73 (2015). I will henceforth refer to this as “the 
Article.” 
 2. Id. at 75–76. 
 3. Id. at 123. 
 4. Id. at 78. 
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beneficiaries and trustees, who have much to gain in trustee fees from 
trusts that will exist in perpetuity.5 Setting itself up as pro-beneficiary, the 
Article’s first and primary argument against trust term extension highlights 
the harm to existing beneficiaries from the practice: it “would force 
residuary beneficiaries who would have received an outright distribution 
under the original instrument to accept a less valuable lifetime interest 
under the modified trust.”6 
Trust term extension certainly impairs existing beneficiaries’ interests, 
but it would also provide concrete benefits to future potential beneficiaries 
who would be added to the trust. The loss experienced by existing 
beneficiaries’ through the conversion of their interests into a different and 
less valuable form is their successor beneficiaries’ gain. Thus, these groups 
have interests that are in direct conflict with each other. What makes this 
situation different from other successive beneficiary conflicts, however, is 
that these future beneficiaries do not exist (yet), and trustees thus owe them 
no duties.7 But this theoretical tension still reveals that “beneficiaries” are 
not necessarily a singular class, existing in opposition to either the settlor 
or the trustee. Some subset of potential beneficiaries might find common 
cause with settlors who want perpetual trusts or trustees who want to 
convert the trusts they administer into them. 
Recognizing this theoretical conflict between classes of beneficiaries is 
significant because it exposes the implicit choice of baseline in the 
Article’s legal analysis.8 The baseline used is the current state of affairs, or 
the trust instrument as written. The Article’s second argument against trust 
term extension makes this explicit, in reasoning that the equitable 
deviation doctrine typically only considers what is contained in the finally 
executed trust instrument, rather than “entertain[ing] a reconsideration of 
the settlor’s original intent.”9 In this context, the trust instrument 
incorporates a definite end point as the trust must comply with the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. Thus, it also incorporates a policy preference in favor 
of restrictions on dead hand control embodied in some form by the Rule. A 
particular type of legal analysis follows. The beneficiaries identified in the 
trust document are presented as possessing the entitlement to trust assets in 
a certain form, and change in that status quo brings them harm. 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Id. at 87–88. 
 6. Id. at 95–96. 
 7. The most relevant duty may be the duty of impartiality, requiring the trustee give “due 
regard to the beneficiaries’ respective interests.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803 (2000). 
 8. See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: 
The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 914 (1989) (“The starting points—or 
baselines—for legal argument help explain outcomes.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 902–03 (1987) (analyzing how using the common law as a baseline affects 
one’s constitutional analysis). 
 9. Weisbord, supra note 1, at 97.  
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This baseline is a reasonable one, but it is not the only one. What if, 
instead, we use the settlor’s intent as the baseline?10 Some nontrivial 
portion of settlors would likely have desired to create perpetual or near-
perpetual trusts.11 Thus, the preferred trust of many settlors is one in which 
many generations of beneficiaries would be represented, instead of the 
truncated trust that was required by the more restrictive law at the time of 
the trust’s creation. Under a baseline of settlor intent, and assuming the 
settlor wanted a perpetual trust, the entitlement to trust assets belongs not 
only to the beneficiaries identified in the trust document, but also to future 
beneficiaries who were not permitted into that document because of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities. In this framing, trust term extension becomes an 
important corrective. The trust reverts back to its ideal form as imagined by 
the settlor, restoring to all those beneficiaries benefits to which they were 
denied by laws restricting dead hand control to an arbitrary number of 
years. 
Thus, the choice of baseline affects the legal analysis, and the choice of 
baseline likely reflects a set of normative priors about dead hand control.12 
This makes the discussion over trust term extension largely derivative of 
the debate over the Rule Against Perpetuities. This point occasionally 
bubbles to the surface, for instance in the Article’s third argument against 
trust term extension: “modifying a trust to create new beneficial interests 
for future generations of the settlor’s descendants undermines the trust law 
requirement of a definite, ascertainable beneficiary.”13 The lack of an 
ascertainable beneficiary is a problem with legally permitting perpetual 
trusts at all rather than being a problem with allowing trust term extension 
per se. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 10. This is also not an unreasonable starting point. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: 
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in 
determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is 
given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”). The Article does consider arguments that use 
a baseline of settlor intent. See Weisbord, supra note 1, at 94–95. However, after considering the 
arguments against trust term extension, it rather quickly concludes without further argument that 
“[o]n balance, the arguments against trust term extension would seem to greatly outweigh those in 
favor.” Id. at 99. 
 11. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 362 (2005) (noting 
that settlors have taken their trust business to certain states that have abolished the Rule Against 
Perpetuities). 
 12. Part IV of the Article could be seen as an argument about which baseline to select, by 
seeing which trend, towards or away from dead hand control, is dominant. With significant 
movement in both directions, though—from the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities on the 
one hand to the evolution of various trust doctrines on the other—it is hard to establish a clear 
winner in this exercise. 
 13. Weisbord, supra note 1, at 97–98. 
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II.  DIVINING SETTLOR INTENT 
Must one’s view of trust term extension flow directly from one’s 
normative view of the Rule Against Perpetuities and dead hand control?  
Not necessarily. The Article’s last argument against trust term extension 
presents a way out: “applying equitable deviation in this context would 
present a significant risk of misinterpreting the settlor’s intent, particularly 
in cases where the settlor is deceased or incapacitated.”14 In other words, it 
might be difficult to determine with certainty whether a settlor actually 
wanted a perpetual trust at all. The entity responsible for bringing the 
question before the court—the trustee—is seriously conflicted on that very 
issue. This argument emphasizes practical concerns about the 
implementation of trust term extensions. 
The Article endorses a reform that would prohibit the addition of 
beneficiaries not identified in the original trust document through trust 
modification doctrines.15 This reform has much to recommend it, most 
notably its ease of implementation. It is also theoretically justified, if one 
has a normative preference for restrictions on dead hand control. It may not 
be appealing, however, to those who are either in favor of perpetuities 
reform or ambivalent about it. These groups may still not favor unrestricted 
trust term extension, given the practical difficulties of determining settlor 
intent, but they may be open to it. 
A more modest reform might be attractive to all of these constituencies, 
creating a form of overlapping consensus. Instead of prohibiting trust term 
extension altogether, one could merely require clear and convincing 
evidence of settlor intent to create a perpetual trust before permitting trust 
term extension under modification doctrines. This heightened evidentiary 
standard would put the burden of proving settlor intent on the proponent of 
trust term extension. In addition, it is an approach that is consistent with 
how both the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement deal with the 
analogous area of reformation of wills.16 The rationale that applies to 
reformation also applies here: 
Tilting the risk of an erroneous factual determination in this 
fashion is appropriate because the party seeking reformation 
is seeking to establish that a donative document does not 
reflect the donor’s intention. This tilt also deters a potential 
plaintiff from bringing a reformation suit on the basis of 
insubstantial evidence.17 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Id. at 98–99. 
 15. Id. at 123. 
 16. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-805 (2008, as amended 2010) (adopting a clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard for reformation of even unambiguous terms in wills); see also RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 10, at § 12.1 (2003).  
 17. Id. at § 12.1 cmt. e (2003). 
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The heightened evidentiary requirement in the case of trust term 
extension will prevent trust modifications that were not clearly desired by 
the settlor and also prevent trustees from depriving existing beneficiaries of 
rights without substantial evidence that the settlor would have wanted it 
that way. While this solution does not stop the expansion of perpetual 
trusts through trust modification doctrines completely, it likely does ensure 
that it will only occur when the settlor actually desired it. 
CONCLUSION 
If the question of trust term extension eventually does reach a court, as 
it may, the presiding judge’s view of the case will likely be influenced by 
her underlying policy preferences about dead hand control. This, in turn, 
will likely determine which baselines she adopts for the legal analysis. 
However, Professor Weisbord’s Article identifies a different set of 
practical concerns that may worry those of multiple ideological stripes. 
These concerns point to a particular reform: heightening evidentiary 
requirements for proponents of trust term extension to ensure that 
modification to make a trust perpetual in fact represents the settlor’s intent. 
